FIXED MONETARY REGIMES – DEBATES AND ARGUMENTS (Continued)
https://doi.org/10.21686/2410-7395-2023-2-72-84
Abstract
The article elaborates material published earlier in the journal (Fixed Monetary Regimes – Debates and Arguments // International Trade and Trade Policy, 2023, Vol. 9, N 1 (33), pp. 23–35). The second part of the article examines the features of specific manifestations of types of institutional decisions within the framework of fixed exchange rates. The main problems arising in the coordination of independent national exchange rates are presented. Four institutional and organizational solutions to coordination problems are described in detail, namely: short-term capital movement control, currency management and unilateral dollarization (euroization), as well as a clearing union. The advantages and disadvantages of these solutions are discussed.
About the Authors
N. Nenovsky
University of Picardy Jules Verne; Bulgarian National Bank
France
France
Nikolay Nenovsky, Doctor of Economics, Professor
Economics, Finance, Management and Innovation Laboratory (LEFMI)
80025
Hauts-de-France
Amiens
Bulgaria
Sofia
A. Faudot
University of Grenoble Alpes, Center of Research in Economics of Grenoble (CREG)
France
France
Adrien Faudot, Associate Professor of Economics, IUT teacher
26000
51 Rue Barthelemy de Laffemas
Valence
Grenoble
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Review
For citations:
Nenovsky N., Faudot A. FIXED MONETARY REGIMES – DEBATES AND ARGUMENTS (Continued). International Trade and Trade Policy. 2023;9(2):72-84. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.21686/2410-7395-2023-2-72-84
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