mttpМеждународная торговля и торговая политикаInternational Trade and Trade Policy2410-73952414-4649ФГБОУ ВО "Российский экономический университет им. Г.В. Плеханова"10.21686/2410-7395-2023-2-72-84mttp-600Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ЗАРУБЕЖНЫХ СТРАНECONOMY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIESФИКСИРОВАННЫЕ ДЕНЕЖНЫЕ РЕЖИМЫ – ДЕБАТЫ И АРГУМЕНТЫ (продолжение)FIXED MONETARY REGIMES – DEBATES AND ARGUMENTS (Continued)НеновскиН.NenovskyN.

Николай Неновски, доктор экономических наук, профессор

80025

улица Сен-Леу, 76

О-де-Франс

Амьен

Болгария

София

Nikolay Nenovsky, Doctor of Economics, Professor

Economics, Finance, Management and Innovation Laboratory (LEFMI)

80025

Hauts-de-France

Amiens

Bulgaria

Sofia

nenovsky@gmail.comФодоА.FaudotA.

Адриен Фодо, доцент, преподаватель IUT

кафедра экономики

26000

IUT Valence

ул. Бартелеми де Лаффемас, 51

Гренобль

Валанс

Adrien Faudot, Associate Professor of Economics, IUT teacher

26000

51 Rue Barthelemy de Laffemas

Valence

Grenoble

adrien.faudot@univ-grenoble-alpes.frУниверситет Пикардии Жюля Верна; Болгарский национальный банкФранцияUniversity of Picardy Jules Verne; Bulgarian National BankFranceУниверситет Гренобль-Альпы, CREGФранцияUniversity of Grenoble Alpes, Center of Research in Economics of Grenoble (CREG)France202311062023927284Copyright © Неновски Н., Фодо А., 20232023Неновски Н., Фодо А.Nenovsky N., Faudot A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://mttp.rea.ru/jour/article/view/600

   Статья является продолжением опубликованного ранее в журнале материала (Фиксированные денежные режимы – дебаты и аргументы // Международная торговля и торговая политика. – 2023. – Т. 9. – № 1 (23). – С. 22–35). Во второй части статьи рассматриваются особенности конкретных проявлений типов институциональных решений в рамках фиксированных обменных курсов. Представлены основные проблемы, возникающие при согласовании независимых национальных валютных курсов. Подробно описаны четыре институциональных и организационных решения проблем координации, а именно: краткосрочный контроль за движением капитала, валютное управление и односторонняя долларизация (евроизация), а также клиринговый союз. Обсуждаются преимущества и недостатки указанных решений.

   The article elaborates material published earlier in the journal (Fixed Monetary Regimes – Debates and Arguments // International Trade and Trade Policy, 2023, Vol. 9, N 1 (33), pp. 23–35). The second part of the article examines the features of specific manifestations of types of institutional decisions within the framework of fixed exchange rates. The main problems arising in the coordination of independent national exchange rates are presented. Four institutional and organizational solutions to coordination problems are described in detail, namely: short-term capital movement control, currency management and unilateral dollarization (euroization), as well as a clearing union. The advantages and disadvantages of these solutions are discussed.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.